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NOTES
INTERIM DEEP SEABED MINING
LEGISLATION: AN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
INTRODUCTION
After eight years of debate and deliberation, Congress has passed a
comprehensive deep seabed mining bill, the Deep Seabed Hard Min-
eral Resources Act.' The primary goal of the Act is to establish an
interim legal framework for the exploration and recovery of hard min-
erals from the ocean floor. In addition to promoting the development
of seabed resources, the legislation imposes environmental controls
upon deep seabed mining operators. The Act appears at a time when
other nations are considering similar legislation and when the United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference is nearing resolution of its efforts to
draft a treaty governing the sea and its resources. This unilateral effort
by the United States to regulate deep ocean mining has received both
domestic praise and international criticism. The legislation, however,
resolutely establishes guidelines to govern domestic enterprises in their
worldwide quest for the ocean's mineral resources.
Notwithstanding strong international opposition to the legislation,
its proponents have made convincing arguments for its passage.2 The
1. Act of June 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-283, § 1, 94 Stat. 553 (codified at 30 U.S.C.A. § 1401
(West Supp. 1980)) [hereinafter cited as Act].
Deep seabed mining legislation has been presented in every session of Congress since the
Metcalf Bill was introduced in January 1972. See Development of Hard Mineral Resources of
the Deep Seabed- Hearings on S. 2801 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials and Fu-
els, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
The legislative history of the Act provides some insight into the complexity of Congres-
sional deliberations. Representative John Murphy (New York) introduced H.R. 2759 on
March 8, 1979. The House Bill was identical to H.R. 3350, which had passed the House
during the 95th Congress; that bill later failed to pass the Senate. See generally Deep Seabed
Mining, H.R. REP. No. 96-411, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 HousE
REPORT]. On February 26, 1979, Senator Spark Matsunaga (Hawaii) introduced a Senate
analogue to the House Bill, S. 493. The Senate bill was similar to S. 2053, which failed to
pass the Senate in October, 1979. See generally Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act, S. REP.
No. 96-307, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 SENATE REPORT]. On
December 14, 1979, the Senate passed S. 493. The House passed H.R. 2759 on June 9, 1980.
In its deliberations, the Senate amended the House bill by adopting the wording of S. 493.
The amended "House" bill passed the Senate on June 23, 1980. Finally, the House con-
curred with the Senate's Matsunaga Amendment and passed the reworded version of H.R.
2759 on June 25, 1980. The Senate bill therefore became law with a minimum of House
debate, under its new House designation, H.R. 2759.
2. International authorities, citing the intractability of the developing nations opposing ocean
mining, argued that United States passage of seabed mining legislation would greatly hinder
the Law of the Sea Conference [hereinafter cited as LOS] by polarizing opinion. See Laylin,
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prospective harmful effects of mining and processing seabed minerals
are, nevertheless, lingering problems of great complexity. The purpose
of this note is to assess the strength of the interim deep seabed mining
legislation in light of the international environmental standards which
will ultimately govern ocean mining activity. This note will focus upon
the environmental control provisions of the Act and the existing and
proposed international environmental controls which are applicable to
the deep ocean.
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM: REVITALIZED INDUSTRIAL
PROFITS OR ENVIRONMENTAL CHAOS?
Abundant Resources and Profit Projections
Because recent technological developments will permit mining of
rich ocean-bottom resources, 3 commercial development of manganese
nodules may represent the industrial rebirth of the energy-poor West-
ern world.4 Optimistic projections have been made that the United
States' economic security and balance of payments may greatly im-
prove with the development of deep seabed mining. In addition, many
of the world's developing countries may be able to share in the wealth
generated by seabed mining, not only because of their proximity to
identified mining areas but because of the provisions of the prospective
Law of the Sea Treaty.5 Thus, the manganese nodule may signal a new
The Law to Govern Deepsea Mining Until Superseded by International Agreement, 10 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 433, 435-437 (1973). As late as 1977, Elliot L. Richardson, Ambassador at
Large and Special Representative of the President for the LOS Conference, was calling for a
delay to Congressional action on the matter. See Development of the Hard Mineral Resources
of the Deep Seabed Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Mines and Mining on HR. 3350 and
HR. 3652, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1977) (statement of Elliot Richardson) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Mines and Mining Report].
By 1979, however, the executive branch had abandoned its opposition to the legislation.
Proponents of the Act pointed to the need for the manganese nodules, the growing depen-
dency on unstable foreign sources of minerals, the need for development capital, the growing
environmental hazards of seabed activities, and the uncertainty of the LOS negotiations. See
1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30-44. In 1979, Elliot Richardson testified that pro-
gress at the LOS Conference had stalled and that the executive branch no longer found the
legislation objectionable. Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography on
HR. 2759, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 25 & 78 (1979) (statements of Elliot L. Richardson) [here-
inafter cited as 1979 LOS Hearings].
3. The 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 36, estimates potential mineral recovery from a
single mine site to be about three million tons per year. That would mean a yield of approxi-
mately 42,000 tons of nickel, 37,000 tons of copper, 4,000 tons of cobalt, and 750,000 tons of
manganese per year. Thus, a single mine could produce 5% of the world's nickel, 1% of its
copper, 12% of its cobalt, and 7% of its manganese. A United Nations report estimates that
mine fields in the Pacific Ocean could produce up to 500 billion tons of mineable hard min-
erals. UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, A GUIDE TO THE NEW
LAW OF THE SEA, Reference Paper No. 18, at 26 (March 1979).
4. Profits from ocean mining are expected to amount to trillions of dollars over the long run.
One authority has estimated that the value of manganese nodules will rival the value of
ocean petroleum resources, concluding that ocean mining could save the United States $40
billion in balance of payments by the year 2000 (assuming that ocean mining began immedi-
ately). Welling, Ocean Mining Systems, 1977 Mines and Mining Report, supra note 2, at 299.
5. Articles 136 and 137 of the 1979 LOS Draft Treaty provide that seabed resources are the
"common heritage of mankind" and are not subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of any na-
tion. Articles 148 through 155 establish mechanisms to assure developing nations the right to
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era of Western industrial might and the birth of a stronger world econ-
omy.
Deep seabed nodules are potato-shaped objects, generally found at
ocean depths exceeding three miles. Although their precise origin re-
mains subject to scientific debate,6 there is general agreement that the
nodules originate from a geochemical process involving the accretion
of minerals around organic sediment from the ocean floor. The com-
position of these nodules is unique; they are known to contain over
twenty metallic elements.7 In addition to manganese, the nodules con-
tain nickel, copper, and cobalt. These elements are strategically impor-
tant to the United States' economic welfare and national security.'
Seabed nodules are also of significant commercial interest because of
their high ore content and their easily processed oxide materials.9
Start-up Costs and Anticipated Revenue
Since most ocean mining sites are located at depths exceeding three
miles, nodule mining demands the development of sophisticated tech-
nology. Recovery devices require large investments of "start-up" capi-
tal for testing and research. The development of processing
technology, the outfitting of vessels for mining and processing, the
training of personnel, and the construction of on-shore processing
plants will require further acquisition of large sums of investment capi-
tal.'0
participate in international joint ventures to mine manganese nodules. See Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/ Rev. 1 (April 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 LOS Draft Treaty] (one
of several drafts of the Law of the Sea Treaty).
6. 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
7. See 1979 LOS Hearings, supra note 2, at 166 (prepared statement of Marne A. Dubs).
8. The four primary metals found in manganese nodules are listed as "critical materials" by the
General Services Administration. FEDERAL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY, G.S.A., 1978 STOCK-
PILE REPORT TO CONGRESS (1977), as reported in 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 31.
The United States is currently dependent upon foreign sources of certain nonfuel minerals,
including cobalt, nickel and manganese. Id Nickel, in metal form, is used almost exclu-
sively in alloys with special strength requirements or for alloys with high corrosion resist-
ance. Id. Substitutes for nickel are available, but are less economical and could affect
performance of the alloy. Id Copper has special uses in electrical components and thus has
both commercial and military importance. Cobalt is a by-product of nickel and copper min-
ing, and has unique applications in the manufacturing of heat-resistant metals. Id Manga-
nese is an essential element in iron and steel production, and in its principle uses there is no
known substitute. Id For background on the problem of the United States' shortage of hard
minerals, See generally Santini, The Growing Crisis in Strategic and Critical Minerals of the
United States, 7 J. LEGIS. 63 (1980).
9. Deep seabed minerals vary in mineral content, but they average approximately 24.2% man-
ganese, 14% iron, 1.0% nickel, and .35% cobalt. This composition compares favorably with
rich land-source ore deposits. See 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
10. See Flipse, Dubs & Greenwald, Preproduction Manganese Nodule Mining Activities and Re-
quirements, Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Miner-
als, Materials andFuels on S 1134, 93rd'Cong., 1st Sess. 602-700 (1973). That report gives a
summary of research and development activities, and describes the unique .equipment used
in the exploration for and testing of mine sites. See Rothstein & Kaufman, The Approaching
Maturity ofDeep Ocean Mining-The Pace Quickens, id at 201. They state that the average
investment cost ranges from $130-240 million for a one-ton-a-day dry recovery system. An-
other report estimates that "[a] four consortium industry would represent an investment of
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Although the projected start-up costs of deep ocean mining are very
high, the estimated profits are proportionately higher. The model
ocean mining project, conducted by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (M.I.T.), indicates that a mining operation will cost in ex-
cess of $560 million, exclusive of yearly operating costs of approxi-
mately $100 million. After taxes, the rate-of-return predicted by the
M.I.T. model is approximately eighteen percent, resulting in a gross
annual revenue of nearly $260 million." Unfortunately, these projec-
tions do not consider the potential "cost" of environmental pollution
which may occur during ocean mining and processing or the interna-
tional consequences which may result from pollution caused by ocean
mining operations.
Potential Environmental Impact of Ocean Mining
Despite the enormous profits to be reaped from the oceans, the en-
vironmental consequences of deep seabed mining may overshadow the
projections for revitalized industrial profit. At the present time, no
mining company has established a full-scale mining operation. Indus-
try, government, and environmentalists thus cannot predict the precise
impact that deep ocean mining will have on the environment.' 2 Pre-
liminary testing, however, indicates that serious environmental conse-
quences may be unavoidable.
Since 1976 the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) has conducted ocean mining studies, the Deep Ocean Envi-
ronmental Studies (DOMES).' 3 These studies recommend a cautious
approach to commercial development of the ocean floor and monitor-
about $2.6 million, [excluding research and development], working capital, and exploration
expenditures. If these are included, the total [investment] easily exceeds $3 billion." Tinsley,
Financial Requirementsfor Deep Seabed Mining, Mining of the Deep Seabed- Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources, and Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation on S 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 499, 501 (1977).
11. The 1978 M.I.T. Study estimates that the internal rate-of-return for such a project will be
approximately 18%, resulting in a pay-back period of about 5.4 years. 1979 HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 28. The M.I.T. Study has also been criticised as being overly optimistic. See
Diedrich, Miller & Schneider, Analysis of the M. T Study on Deep Ocean Mining-Critical
Remarks on Technologies and Cost Estimates (March 1979), reported in 1979 LOS Hearings,
supra note 2, at 403-415.
12. The development of the deep seabed is an experimental penetration into a largely unex-
plored world. The world's oceans are estimated to cover approximately 139 million square
miles, of which 10.4 million square miles cover the continental shelves. See Monard &
Smith, Hypsometry of Ocean Basin Provinces, 71 J. OF GEOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH, 4305,
4315 (1966). Yet, as recently as 1967 it was estimated that less than 20 percent of the conti-
nental shelf areas of the world had been explored. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1967, § 3, at 1,
col. 1. While the continental shelves have been explored in the past decade, the remaining
130 million square miles of "deep ocean" beyond the continental shelves can be analogized
to the vast, unexplored regions of outer space. Man is standing at the edge of a pristine
world. Contemplation of possibly irreversible effects of pollution is a necessity. See 1979
LOS Hearings, supra note 2, at 278 (statement of Sylvia A. Earle). It is also asserted that
because no scientist has had an opportunity to observe, test or consider the effects of an
ocean mining site, no one can state with assurance what impact such mining will have on the
environment. Id at 290 (statement of James N. Barnes).
13. DOMES, NOAA Technical Memorandum ERL MESA-15, Progress Report, Deep Ocean
Mining Study, Phase I (Aug. 1976) [hereinafter cited .as 1976 DOMES Report].
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ing of mining sites and surrounding areas. The results of Phase I of the
studies indicate that deep seabed mining will have an adverse impact
on the ocean environment; they are inconclusive in determining the
ability of the natural processes in the seas to overcome any negative
effect. 14
The NOAA studies predict serious environmental consequences can
result from ocean mining operations. The most serious problems are
the following: (1) damage from mining sediment discharge, (2) chemi-
cal changes in the water environment, (3) temperature changes in the
immediate area, (4) increased ocean particulate levels, (5) changes in
light penetration levels, (6) transportation of deep-water bacteria and
organisms to higher levels, and (7) the entry of heavy metals into the
food chain. 5 The DOMES also indicate a specific concern for poten-
tial pollution caused by dumping insoluble toxic wastes into the ocean
during ship-processing operations.'
6
A 1979 Senate committee report' 7 highlighted environmental im-
pacts associated with deep ocean mining and ship-processing opera-
tions. Most notable is the potential discharge of waste material into the
ocean. Deep water mining operations will discharge effluent in
"plumes" at the bottom as well as at the surface of the ocean. The
toxicity of the heavy metals found in the nodules have also raised Sen-
ate concern. The release of toxic metals as waste products may not
only damage the immediate environment, but also penetrate the food
chain and ultimately poison commercial food species such as tuna.' 8
14. Id at xii-xiii. See also the Senate's report on environmental impacts of ocean mining, SEN.
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, DEEP SEABED MINERAL RESOURCES ACT,
S. REP. No. 96-360, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 SENATE ENVI-
RONMENTAL REPORT].
15. 1976 DOMES Report, supra note 13, at 133-149.
16. Id Phase II of DOMES involves on-site tests of one mining company's pilot operations in
the North Pacific during April and May, 1978. The results indicate that in a small test-
operation environmental impacts were not detrimental to the immediate area. 1979 LOS
Hearings, supra note 2, at 173-176 (copy of correspondence from Marne A. Dubs to Dr.
Robert A. Bums, DOMES Project Manager).
17. 1979 SENATE ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 14. It is an abbreviated, but accurate,
summary of the major environmental threats set out in the DOMES, Phase I. The body of
this Senate report is only four pages long, contrasting with more than four thousand pages of
published hearings and reports in Congress since the 1972 Metcalf Bill.
18. The report makes the following summary of possible adverse effects of mining on the ocean
environment:
Significant effects upon the marine environment can be expected from discharges dur-
ing deep seabed mining activities, including the disposal of wastes generated by min-
ing and any processing of the recovered minerals at sea.
These wastes will include bottom waters, living organisms or biota, sediment, and
nodule fragments. Special concerns have been raised with respect to the potential
toxicity of those nodule fragments. Elements such as chromium, cadmium, and arse-
nic, following possible thermal and/or chemical alteration, could be toxic to marine
fife. In addition, dumping of untreated waste ammonia acid leachate used in the
ocean processing of nodules will disrupt and possibly destroy the ecological balance
of the mining processing area.
The hydraulic system expected to be used by most of the joint mining ventures
will discharge effluent in plumes at the bottom as well as at the surface of the ocean.
These activities have a number of potentially adverse environmental impacts. Sedi-
ment materials from surface discharges could penetrate the food chain, ultimately
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The dumping of processed waste material, following thermal or chemi-
cal processing at sea, may have further toxic effects on the environ-
ment. 19 Ammonia leachate and other chemicals used in ship-based
processing operations pose a particular threat. Dumping toxic chemi-
cals or "sludge" wastes containing such chemicals into the ocean may
disrupt or destroy the ecological balance of the area surrounding the
processing-ship.20
Full-scale mining operations have not yet begun, therefore, an esti-
mate of the environmental effects of such activity is impossible, unless
scientific studies are conducted at test sites. Monitoring of commercial
mining and ship-processing is also necessary. However, commercial
operations could not be monitored without the establishment of federal
regulations requiring private industry to permit scientific tests at sea.
The paramount question to be examined is whether United States regu-
lations will meet international environmental standards.
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION STANDARDS FOR THE WORLD'S OCEANS
International Impact of Ocean Mining Pollution
If toxic wastes from United States' commercial mining operations
adversely affect the ocean environment, the international repercussions
could be dangerous and unpredictable.2' Many developing countries
affecting commercial species such as tuna; these discharges could expose the ocean life
system to long-term chronic levels of potentially poisonous heavy metals; they could
affect the stimulation of bacterial growth through changes in oxygen levels; and they
could reduce light penetration essential for photosynthesis and fish propagation.
It is critical that government increase its efforts to improve scientific understand-
ing of the effects of deep ocean mining.
Id at 2.
19. See 1979 LOS Hearings, supra note 2, at 315 (statement of James N. Barnes), where it is
reported that "[v]arious processing alternatives would produce different quantities of toxic
substances as wastes," but the following would be produced as waste: (I) Barium (76,000
lbs./day); (2) Lanthanium (31,000 lbs./day); (3) Iron (8,600 lbs./day); (4) Vanadium (3,800
lbs./day); (5) Arsenic (864 Lbs./day); (6) Thallium (408 lbs./day); (7) Antimony (280
lbs./day); (8) Chromium (171 lbs./day); and (9) Cadmium (12 lbs./day). Id. (citing I & II
DAMES & MOORE, DESCRIPTION OF MANGANESE NODULE PROCESSING ACTIVITIES FOR EN-
VIRONMENTAL STUDIES (Aug. 1977)).
20. The alternative mineral extraction processes being considered by industry are (I) an ammo-
nia leaching system, (2) a hydrochloric acid leaching system, and (3) a pyrometallurgical
system. Both the ammonia leaching system and the hydrochloric acid leaching system are
designed to extract manganese from the nodules. 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 28.
The enviromental impacts of ammonia leachate has raised the most concern. 1979 SENATE
ENVIROMENTAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
21. The sea is an important source of food for many countries. It would be easy to construct a
scenario of geopolitical conflict over availability of edible fish. Fish stocks are particularly
vulnerable to pollution because their breeding and feeding areas constitute such a small por-
tion of the oceans. See supra note 18; Kemp, Threatsfrom the Seas. Sourcesfor Asian Mari-
time Conflict, 19 ORBIS 1037, 1044 (1975), in which the author notes:
Fish, like oil and gas, are not distributed evenly throughout the oceans. Abundant
fish stocks occur where major upwellings of cold, nutrient-rich waters provide food
for plant and lower animal life upon which fish feed. The major areas of upwelling
consist of less than one percent of the world's ocean surface.
Historic conflicts over fishing rights have often produced violent international disputes.
For example, Japan and the Soviet Union were long in conflict over disputed fishing rights in
[Vol. 8:73
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are dependent upon the sea for food; sea-dependency increases as
world population soars. Developed countries, such as Japan and the
Soviet Union, also depend upon the oceans for a large portion of their
food supply and are keenly protective of their ocean fishing preserves.22
Ocean mining touches international political issues of the most tender
nature. It is therefore in the national interest of the United States to
proceed cautiously with commercial mining operations.
Since the oceans cover approximately seventy percent of the earth's
surface and are beyond national jurisdiction,23 international law is the
appropriate source of marine pollution control standards. United
States' mining activities should meet minimum environmental stan-
dards prescribed by the international community. In addition to ex-
isting international standards, the pending Law of the Sea (LOS)
Treaty will establish an international regime to govern the oceans. The
United States should meet the environmental protection standards pro-
posed by the LOS Treaty as well. Conformity with existing and pro-
spective international standards is the appropriate test for domestic
deep seabed mining legislation.
Existing International Controls on Ocean Pollution
Current international agreements deal ineffectively with the poten-
tial for ocean mining pollution. The international community has only
recently become aware of the seriousness of global pollution. Custom-
ary international law,24 a slowly evolving body of law, has not kept
abreast of technological developments which now make commercial
the North Pacific. During the period 1946-1970, the Soviets seized 1,336 Japanese fishing
vessels, with crews totaling 11,316, killing 32 crewmen. Id at 1045.
22. The North Pacific is a critical area for international conflict over marine resources. Japan,
Russia, and Asian nations compete in these waters for fish stocks.
Of all the geopolitical areas in the world, none is more replete with sources for conflict
[than Asia] . . . [Increasing demand for ocean resources, based on high population
growth in the poorer Asian countries and high living standards in the rich Asian
countries, will result in intensified competition among regional states for off-shore oil,
gas andfish ....
Id at 1037 (emphasis added).
On December 10, 1976, Russia moved to protect its ocean fishing claims. The Presidium
of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet issued an edict declaring a two-hundred-mile exclusive fish-
ing zone. Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.- Edict on Provisional Measures/or the Preserva-
tion of Living Resources and the Regulation of Fishing in Marine Areas, 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1381 (1976).
23. While legal authorities agree that the ocean is beyond national jurisdiction, there is historic
disagreement in regard to the right of nations or their nationals to lay claim to deep seabed
resources. Hugo Grotius, in Mare Liberum (1608) and De Jure Praedae (1609) wrote that the
sea was res communis, like the air, and that man may not claim what is the property of all.
'John Seldon, in Mare Clausem Sine Dorminio Mars (1635) argued that the ocean was res
nullius, the property of no one. Seldon's view is the prevalent one today; thus, ocean re-
sources could be claimed by right of dominion. Note, Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Re-
sources-Chaos or Legal Order?, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 577 (1973). The emerging view is
that the seabed is "the common heritage of mankind." See note 29 supra, for the United
Nations Resolution (No. 2749) which adopted the modern viewpoint.
24. International legal authorities recognize several elements which make up customary law:
(1) "concordant practice" by a number of states relating to a particular situation; (2)
continuation of that practice over "a considerable period of time;" (3) a conception
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mining feasible. An examination of international accords and agree-
ments, however, reveals a growing concern among nations for the pre-
vention of ocean pollution.
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea. The earliest
attempt to deal with ocean pollution was the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, the Convention on the High Seas,25 adopted in 1958. Although
aimed at the problem of oil-spill pollution, article 24 of the Convention
also requires signatory states to prevent marine pollution "resulting
from the exploitation and exploration of the seabed and its subsoil, tak-
ing account of existing treaty provisions on the subject."'2 6 A liberal
interpretation of this article proscribes any form of seabed pollution.
Article 25 places a burden on consenting states to prevent pollution of
the seas "resulting from any activities with radio-active (sic) materials
or other harmful agents."27 Unfortunately, this provision could be
strictly interpreted as applicable only to ocean pollution caused by oil
spills or radioactive wastes.2 8 The problems of ocean mining pollution,
which could not be anticipated by the drafters of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, cannot be resolved by reference to this agreement.
United Nations Resolution No. 2749 on the Deep Seabed. On De-
cember 17, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Dec-
laration of Principles Governing the Deep Sea-Bed (sic) and the Ocean
Floor.29 Ratified by the United States, the Resolution declares that the
seabed and ocean floor are beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
and that the resources located there are "the common heritage of man-
kind."' 30 It further declares the need for international measures to pre-
vent marine pollution caused by seabed mining activities. 3' Members
of the United Nations General Assembly who supported this resolution
that the practice is required by or consistent with international law; and (4) general
acquiescence in that practice by other states.
H.J. STEINER & D.F. VAGTs, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 258 (2d ed. 1976).
25. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 28, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
26. Id art. 24.
27. Id art. 25(2) (emphasis added).
28. At least one legal authority has argued that the principle ejusdem generis could be applied to
narrow the scope of article 25(2). See Lanctot, Marine Pollution: A Critique of Present and
Proposed International Agreements and Institutions-4 Suggested Global Oceans' Environ-
mental Regime, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 67, 69 (1972). Mr. Lanctot's article presents convincing
evidence in favor of an international regime for the oceans which provides strong environ-
mental controls.
29. Declaration of Principles Go verning the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28)
24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). The General Assembly vote was impressive with 108 in favor,
none against, and 14 abstentions.
30. Id; see, note 22 supra, for the conflicting legal doctrines advanced by Grotius and Seldon.
The viewpoint adopted by Congress is that existing international law has followed Seldon's
doctrine ofres nullius. Thus, despite United States support for the Resolution, "the common
heritage of mankind" remains undefined until the LOS Treaty is ratified.
31. With respect to activities [of the seabed and ocean floor], States shall take appropriate
measures for and shall co-operate in the adoption and implementation of international
rules, standards and procedures for inter alia:
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also pledged their cooperation in implementing international rules to
avert contamination of the ocean environment.
Although it purports to protect the ocean environment, Resolution
No. 2749, like other United Nations resolutions, is "soft law"; unlike a
formal treaty, it will not impose binding obligations.32 On the other
hand, United Nations resolutions manifest generally accepted jurispru-
dential values regarding the "spirit" of developing international law.3 3
The 1972 Convention on Dumping of Wastes at Sea. The Conven-
tion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter was adopted on December 29, 1972. The parties to the
Convention, which include the United States, 34 promised to "promote
the effective control of the marine environment .. .and to take all
practicable steps to prevent pollution of the sea by the dumping of
waste and other matter [likely] to create hazards to human health,"35 or
to the ocean environment. The treaty does not extend to pollution
caused by deep ocean mining or ship-processing. Apparently, the
drafters anticipated the ultimate adoption of the LOS Treaty and chose
to avoid lengthy deliberations and duplication by merely excluding
seabed mining activities from the Convention.3 6
The 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. The
1973 Convention to prevent pollution from ships at sea 37 suffers from
limitations similar to those of the Dumping Convention. Article 2 of
(a) Prevention of pollution and contamination, and other hazards to the marine envi-
ronment, . . . and of interference with the ecological balance...
(b) Protection and conservation of the natural resources of the area and prevention of
damage to the flora and fauna.
id. at 11.
32. Kiss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 25
(1976). The term "soft law" is apparently an invention of the author, but it accurately de-
scribes unenforcible international agreements.
33. Id Social values or ethical considerations promulgate "consensual guidelines" which may
ultimately become binding as custom. See note 24 supra.
34. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165. The United States ratified the Convention
on August 30, 1975.
35. Id art. 1.
36. Id art. I, para. (c). See Leitzell, The Ocean Dumping Convention-A Hopeful Beginning, 10
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 502, 505 (1973) regarding the duplication of LOS Treaty provisions.
The LOS convention was called for by General Assembly resolution in the same year the
Dumping Convention was being negotiated.
Article III of the Dumping Convention expressly provides that pollution associated with
the exploration or exploitation of the seabed "will not be covered." Id. art. III, para. 1(c).
In Article XII, however, the parties pledge to promote international measures to prevent
pollution caused by wastes "directly arising from, or related to ... off-shore processing of
seabed mineral resources." Id art. XII(f).
37. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (Nov. 2, 1973) (London
Draft) [hereinafter cited as London Draft], reported in 4 LAY, CHURCHILL & NORQUIST,
NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 345 (1973). The Convention is intended to re-
place the 1954 London Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil. Although
the London Draft was approved for form and content by 58 delegates, it has not been ratified
by a sufficient number of nations to take effect. The 1973 Draft Convention extends shipping
restrictions to include an extensive list of chemical and metallic compounds, many of which
are indexed in note 19, supra.
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the Convention precludes controls over pollution which might result
from ocean mining activities.38 This restrictive language does not per-
mit sanctions for pollution caused by ocean mining, even where the
offending mining operator dumped toxic wastes into the sea from its
mining or processing ships.
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment. The
1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, held under
the auspices of the United Nations, issued formal recommendations
concerning international efforts to prevent and control pollution.39
One of the recommendations obliges all nations to take steps to prevent
harm to the seas from substances dangerous to marine or human life.4"
The Stockholm Conference has been praised by ecologists as being a
significant step toward developing international cooperation to protect
the environment. Like other informal resolutions and interntional con-
ferences, however, it cannot legally bind any nation to follow its "prin-
ciples of environmental action."41
The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
The First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the
1958 Geneva Convention,42 codified international agreements regard-
ing the use of the oceans and sovereign rights and set forth limited
controls on oil spill and radioactive pollution. A second conference,
which convened in 1960, failed to reach agreement on fundamental is-
sues, including the right of nations and their nationals to develop deep
ocean resources beyond their territorial jurisdiction. During this period
of delay and debate, critical international issues relating to the use and
development of the oceans were handled on a piecemeal basis. This
approach resulted in a disjunctive array of agreements concerning vari-
ous types of ocean pollution.43
In the meantime, ocean mining technology evolved to the point that
commercial recovery of deep seabed nodules became feasible. Interna-
tional debate on the question of commercial development of the ocean
floor increased, and in 1972 the United Nations General Assembly
38. London Draft, supra note 37, at art. 2(3)(b)(ii).
39. See Kiss, supra note 32, at 56, for a discussion of the purposes and principles issued by the
Stockholm Conference.
40. Principle 7 of the action plan created by the Stockholm Conference is a statement on the
obligation of nations to prevent pollution of the ocean. It reads:
States shall take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that
are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and marine life,
to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.
Stockholm Declaration, Declaration on the Human Environment, Stockholm (June 5-16th,
1972), reportedin 2 LAY, CHURCHILL & NORQUIST, supra note 37, at 715.
41. See Kiss, supra note 32, at 26.
42. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
43. 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
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called for an international conference on the law of the sea to deal with
all aspects of ocean law."
The goal of this Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea is to develop and implement an international regime for the
ocean and its resources. Issues under discussion at the Conference in-
clude the exploitation of deep ocean minerals, a two-hundred mile eco-
nomic zone, freedom of scientific research and exploration, and
pollution of the marine environment.45 If adopted, the LOS Treaty
would establish an International Seabed Authority (Authority)46 to
govern the enforcement of the ocean regime and commercial develop-
ment of seabed resources. The Authority is granted broad enforcement
powers by the draft convention47 and is analogous to the United Na-
tions in its organizational structure and powers. The Authority,
through its administrative organ, the Enterprise,48 is empowered to en-
gage in seabed mining activities for the benefit of the "common heri-
tage of mankind" and to collect revenues from approved mining
operations. Indeed, the dominion of the Authority borders on that of a
sovereign nation. It will possess exclusive power to determine the
rights of both nations and private entities to explore and exploit the
seabed resources of the high seas.49
Proposed LOS Treaty Controls on Deep Seabed Mining Pollution.
The most recent "Informal Composite Negotiating Text" (draft
treaty) 50 proposes strong environmental protection controls for the
oceans. Part XII of the Treaty, entitled "Protection and Preservation of
44. G.A. Res. 2881, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (A/8429) 38, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). The resolu-
tion was adopted on December 21, 1971 by a vote of 123 in favor, none opposed and no
abstentions.
45. Other important issues being discussed include the right of innocent passage by military
vessels and aircraft through straits, settlement of disputes involving the seas, national secur-
ity and defense, width of the territorial seas, and the definition of internal waters and archi-
pelagoes. See 1979 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 44.
46. 1979 LOS Draft Treaty, supra note 5, at art. 156.
47. Among these broad powers are the right to assess contributions from nations, the adoption of
rules and regulations for the sharing of economic benefits derived from the seabed, and the
right to implement regulations to carry on commercial operations on the seabed for the bene-
fit of mankind. See generally id arts. 153, 160, & 162.
48. The Enterprise is empowered to carry out "transportation, processing and marketing of min-
erals" from the seabed. Id art. 170.
49. Id arts. 153, 160, 162 & 170. By the LOS Treaty, nations affirm that they have no sover-
eignty over the deep ocean floor. They thereby grant to the Authority the sole right to de-
velop the area "for the benefit of mankind." While an examination of the organization of
the Authority is beyond the scope of this note, it should be understood that such broad
powers created an ideological stumbling block to United States consideration of the LOS
Treaty. An example of industry's concern that the Authority would be dominated by the
"Third World" can be found in 1979 LOS Hearings, supra note 2, at 170 (statement of
Marne A. Dubs).
50. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.
10/Rev. 3 (Aug. 27, 1980) thereinafter cited as 1980 Draft LOS Convention]. This draft
negotiating text was prepared for the Ninth Session of the United Nations LOS Conference,
held in Geneva from July 28 to August 29, 1980.
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the Marine Environment,"'" sets forth broad guidelines which obligate
nations to protect and preserve the ocean environment. For example,
article 209 requires the coastal states "adopt laws and regulations...
to prevent, reduce and control pollution . . . from activities in the
[a]rea undertaken by vessels, installations or structures [under their ju-
risdiction, registry or operating under their authority]. ' 2 Under article
194 of the Treaty, nations must take precautions to see that "rare or
fragile ecosystems" are protected and that they will "take all necessary
steps" to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution arising "from
any source."'5 3 Article 195 obliges nations to take care not to transfer
damage or hazards of pollution from one area to another,54 while arti-
cle 196 requires nations to take "all necessary steps" to avert pollution
caused by the introduction of new or alien species into the environ-
ment.55
Signatory parties are also required to take precautions against envi-
ronmental contamination resulting from the development or use of new
technology. 6 Nations must monitor activities conducted under their
jurisdiction or control that are likely to cause environmental harm.5 7
They must also cooperate to promote international studies, scientific
research, and the exchange of information on marine pollution. 8
Consequences of the Law of the Sea Treaty for the United States'
Mining Program. Beyond requirements for strong environmental pro-
tection after ratification, the Treaty apparently compels signatory states
to pass interim domestic legislation. The interim provisions protect the
environment during the period between final negotiation of the treaty
and the date of its implementation. For example, several treaty provi-
sions require nations to "take all necessary measures" to combat pollu-
tion of the ocean or to "adopt domestic laws and regulations" designed
to "prevent, reduce and control" pollution from various sources. 59 It
would be impossible for a nation to live up to its treaty obligations,
unless it acted immediately to pass interim legislation to control marine
pollution arising from seabed mining or other sources.
Several years may pass between the successful negotiation of the
LOS Treaty and its implementation. Because the United States did not
51. Id The Draft Treaty is organized into comprehensive sections (Parts) with subsections (Ar-
ticles) indicating major topical areas within each section.
52. Id art. 209, para. 2(c); see Appendix I.
53. Id art. 194, para. 3(c); see Appendix I.
54. Id art. 195; see Appendix I.
55. Id art. 196, para. 1; see Appendix I.
56. 1980 Draft LOS Convention, supra note 50; see Appendix I.
57. Id art. 204, para. I. The Treaty requires nations to "keep under surveillance the effects of
any activities which they permit [or engage in] to determine whether these activities are likely
to pollute the environment." Id art. 201, para. 2 (emphasis added).
58. Id art. 200; see Appendix I.
59. Id arts. 194, 196, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 217, & 209, para. 2. See Appendix I.
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support the United Nations moratorium on deep seabed mining,6"
United States' nationals were free to engage in unregulated ocean min-
ing operations. Passage of the Act established interim global regula-
tions on American nationals involved in the development of ocean
mining. By enacting legislation designed to forestall mining activity
and prevent pollution, the United States acted prospectively to avoid
violation of future LOS Treaty obligations.
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act
While an international regime for the oceans was being delayed by
international debate, United States and foreign mining consortia were
being formed for the expeditious development of the deep seabed.6'
The growing need for interim ocean mining controls culminated in
Congressional enactment of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources
Act, designed to promote the "orderly development" 62 of the manga-
nese nodule by United States mining operators. The act has six main
purposes:
Transition to the International Regime/or the Oceans. The Act rec-
ognizes the need for an international regime to govern ocean mining.63
It also provides for federal regulation of United States' nationals in-
volved in ocean exploration or mining activities. Upon ratification of
the LOS Treaty, the provisions of the Act that are inconsistent with the
Treaty will no longer govern deep ocean mining.64
Establishment of Taxesfor the Provision of a Trust Fund. The Act
establishes an extraction tax to ensure the formation of a revenue-shar-
ing trust fund. The United States may use this fund to meet financial
obligations imposed by the LOS Treaty.65 The imposition of this tax
provision is also intended to show the United States' good faith compli-
ance with the LOS Treaty obligation to develop ocean floor resources
for the "common heritage of mankind."
Promotion of LOS Negotiations and Definition of International Obli-
gations. The legislation encourages the successful negotiation of a
60. G.A. Res. 2574 D. Supp. (No. 30) 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969). The vote was 62 in favor, 28
against and 28 abstentions.
61. See Appendix II.
62. 1979 HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at I.
63. Act, supra note 1, at § 2(a).
64. Id §§ 2(b)(1), (2), (3), 201 & 202.
65. Under the provisions of The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Removal Tax Act of 1979, 26
U.S.C.A. § 4495 (West Supp. 1980), the amount of tax imposed is 3.5% of the imputed value
of all mineral resources removed by the operator. The Deep Seabed Revenue Sharing Trust
Fund is incorporated as § 403 of the Act. The act provides that "[i]f an international deep
seabed treaty is ratified [by the United States within ten years after] the date of enactment of
this Act, .. . the Trust Fund shall be available ...for making contributions [which are
required under the treaty]."
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comprehensive LOS Treaty.66 The Act also describes United States
concern that the phrase "common heritage of mankind" has never been
legally defined. It not only requests that the term be defined by future
LOS negotiations,67 but also posits a formula for other nations to fol-
low in defining the parameters of such language. In establishing con-
trols on pollution, setting up a trust fund, and requiring conservation of
resources, the Act proposes itself as a model for other nations to adopt.
Provision for Agreements with Other Nations to Mine the Seabed.
The Act authorizes the United States to enter into agreements with
other nations regarding the development of seabed mineral resources.
The President is empowered to designate as "reciprocating states" those
foreign countries willing to meet United States standards (or compara-
ble standards)68 for exploration and recovery of seabed minerals. In
granting such power, the legislation authorizes executive agreements
with foreign powers regarding mining of the ocean floor.
Securement of Investment Capital to Develop Seabed Resources.
Prior to the passage of this legislation, banks were unwilling to lend the
huge sums necessary for development of the ocean floor, because the
legal status of seabed mining was uncertain.69 By providing domestic
mechanisms facilitating ocean exploration and recovery operations, the
United States eliminated the need for mining consortia to rely on inter-
national law to justify their mining operations. The Act will thus en-
able domestic mining companies to obtain investment capital for the
development of seabed nodules.
66. First, the Act acknowledges that "it is in the national interest of the United States and other
nations to encourage a widely acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty, which will provide a new
legal order for the oceans. . . including [the development of the seabed]." Act, supra note I,
at § 2(a)(8). Second, the Act indicates that it is designed "to establish an interim legal regime
under which technology can be developed and the exploration and recovery of [seabed nod-
ules] can take place until such time as the Law of the Sea Treaty enters into force with
respect to the United States." Id. § 2(a)(16). Third, Congress declares that among the pur-
poses of the Act are ". . . to encourage the successful conclusion of [the LOS Conference]
which will give legal definition to the principle that the hard mineral resources of the deep
seabed are the common heritage of mankind and which will assure [nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to seabed resources for all nations]." Id § 2(b)(I). Fourth, the Act disclaims any asser-
tion of national sovereignty over the deep seabed resources and merely extends jurisdiction
over United States nationals and vessels, and foreign nationals and vessels coming under
United States maritime jurisdiction. 1d. § 3(a)(l) and (2). Finally, the Act encourages the
Secretary of State to negotiate a comprehensive LOS Treaty which will, among other things,
adequately protect the ocean environment from adverse impacts of commercial mining. Id.
§ 3(b)(l) & (2).
67. Id § 2(b)(l); see also notes 23 & 30 supra.
68. Act, supra note 1, at § 118. Under § 118(e) the President is empowered to enter into Execu-
tive Agreements with other nations to designate them as "reciprocating states."
69. In his prepared statement before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, Mr. Marne A. Dubs,
Director of Ocean Resources Development with Kennecott Copper Corp. and a representa-
tive of the American Mining Congress, noted that banks were unwilling to loan funds needed
by the consortia, because the LOS Treaty might "vitiate that investment." 1979 LOS Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 160.
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Provisionfor Regulation of the Mining Industry and Protection of the
Environment. The Act empowers the NOAA to administer the legisla-
tion, regulate ocean exploration and mining activity, issue permits and
licenses, and conduct environmental testing.7" Pursuant to these pow-
ers, the NOAA will issue licenses to citizens engaging in exploration for
seabed resources7' and mining permits to citizens seeking to establish
commercial recovery operatons.72 It will also delimit mining areas sub-
ject to ongoing environmental testing and control standards. 3
Environmental Protection Provisions of the Act
Monitoring and Testing. The Act establishes strong environmental
protection stndards. The NOAA is directed to expand and accelerate
its deep ocean studies, the DOMES, in order to assess the immediate
consequences of exploration and mining on the environment. 74 In ad-
dition, the legislation requires the ongoing testing and assessment of
ship-based and land-based mineral processing operations. 75  The
NOAA must also monitor mining operations for environmental affects
"through[out] the period of exploration and commercial recovery au-
thorized by [the] Act. ' 76
Permits and Licensing. The legislation authorizes the NOAA to set
the terms, conditions, and restrictions for licenses and mining permits.
The standards for licensure and permit issuance are strictly adminis-
tered to ensure that commercial operators "use the best available tech-
nologies for the protection [of the marine environment]. ' 77  The
Administrator of the NOAA may ease these standards whenever the
benefits derived from them are outweighed by adverse "incremental
costs."
78
The legislation also adopts a framework for environmental control
set out in the Clean Water Act.79 This framework ensures that com-
70. See Act, supra note i, at §§ 4, 12, 102, 103, 105, 106, 109, 114, 301, 304 & 308.
71. 1d §§ 102, 103, 105, 106 & 107.
72. 1d §§ 102, 103, 105, 106 & 107.
73. Id § 109(f).
74. The Administrator shall expand and accelerate the program assessing the effects on the
environment from exploration and commercial activities, including seabed processing
and the disposal of processing wastes, so as to provide an assessment, as accurate as
practicable, of environmental impacts.
Id § 109(a)(l).
75. Id § 109(a)(2). This monitoring activity is called "supporting ocean research." It includes
projected studies of (a) natural diversity of seabed biota, (b) life histories of major bethnic,
midwater, and surface water organisms most likely to be affected by seabed activities, (c)
long and short term effects on seabed biota, and (d) assessment of seabased processing of
minerals. Id.
76. Id.
77. 1d § 109(2)(b).
78. Id
79. Id § 109(e). The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977) [hereinafter cited as CW4], is
applied to the ocean by this section, excluding that portion of CWA which exempts "vessels
1981]
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mercial recovery operations on the high seas will meet Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) standards set down by the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).8 ° The inclusion of the
NPDES regulations in the Act establishes appropriate norms for the
testing of mining pollutant levels. In addition, it enables the Adminis-
trator of the NOAA to set reasonable criteria for the issuance of
licenses and permits, as well as for their suspension or revocation."
Environmental Impact Statements. The Act requires Programmic
Environmental Impact Statements (PEIS)82 to assure future compli-
ance with its environmental protection standards.. It establishes the
NOAA and EPA as "joint lead agencies" for the preparation of PEIS's.
Additionally, the Administrator of the NOAA is required to consult
with other federal agencies83 regarding the issuance of PEIS's at the
beginning of commercial activity.84 In order to guarantee the submis-
sion of outside comments to the administrative body, reasonable notice
must be given to all interested parties whenever PEIS's are proposed.
Finally, an additional measure of administrative notice results from a
requirement that final PEIS's be published.85
Sanctionsfor Noncompliance. Beyond administrative action to sus-
pend or revoke licenses and permits, 86 the Act provides civil and crimi-
nal penalties for violation of either the Act or NOAA regulations.
87
and other floating craft" from federal water control standards, CW § 502(12)(B). The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations on the discharge of pollutants under the
CWA are thus made applicable to high seas mining operations.
80. The National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) is a set of federal regula-
tions which proscribe the discharge of any form of pollution (defined by law) into internal
domestic waters or the ocean, under CWA, supra note 79, §§ 402 & 403.
81. See the standards set by the NPDES, published by the federal government in EPA National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. § 125 (1973).
82. Act, supra note 1, at § 109(c) & (d). Additionally, § 109(d) provides that the issuance of any
license or permit is deemed to be "a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment," which thereby applies § 102 of the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1969), to ocean mining activities.
83. The Act requires the Administrator of the NOAA to consult with the EPA, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of the branch of government that is in charge of the United States
Coast Guard, before promulgating regulations. Act, supra note 1, at § 109(b).
84. PEIS's are required whenever a license or permit is issued. Id § 109(d). PEIS's are also
required to be completed immediately for areas of the ocean which are expected to be sites
for exploration and mining soon after the Act's passage. Id. § 109(c). The Act also estab-
lishes the NOAA and EPA as joint lead agencies for the preparation of PEIS's. Id. § 109(c).
In those areas of the ocean which are likely to be first exploited, the NOAA is required to
issue PEIS's within two hundred and seventy days after passage of the Act. Id
§ 109(c)(2)(A). In addition, § 109(c)(2)(B) requires that all PEIS's shall be published in final
form within one hundred and eighty days after the draft environmental impact statement is
published.
85. Id. § 109(c)(2)(B).
86. Id § 106(a)(2). Any permittee or licensee is entitled to a full adjudicative hearing on the
modification, suspension or revocation of a permit or license. Id. § 106(a)(2)(B).
87. See id at §§ 301 (defines prohibited acts), 302 (civil penalties), 303 (criminal penalties); see
Appendix I.
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The Act schedules daily assessments of penalties, encouraging early
compliance with its provisions.88 Civil penalties may be assessed by the
Administrator of the NOAA,8 9 and enforcement of the Act on the high
seas is within the purview of the United States Coast Guard. 90
Private CivilAction. The Act grants standing to any person "having
a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected"'" by com-
mercial exploration or mining activity. Jurisdiction is established in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, without
regard to the amount in controversy or the nationality of the plaintiff.92
Suit may be brought against any person for alleged violations of the
Act or against the NOAA Administrator for improper enforcement of
the Act.93 The Act provides for equitable remedies, monetary dam-
ages, and the award of costs and fees when the court finds that such an
award is appropriate. 94
ASSESSMENT OF THE ACT'S ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
STANDARDS IN LIGHT OF DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Domestic Considerations
The Act will afford reasonable protection for the marine environ-
ment and establish interim guidelines to regulate seabed mining activ-
ity. It guarantees gradual transition to full-scale mining operations by
prohibiting seabed mining until 1988, 91 yet permits exploration and
technological development with concurrent environmental monitoring.
Finally, it adopts a mechanism to incorporate international treaties
which may be ratified in the coming years.
Administration of the Act by the NOAA will assure effective en-
forcement of its provisions. The NOAA provides flexibility for future
environmental control objectives. The Act leaves the NOAA free to
expand its DOMES monitoring and adopts a cautious approach to the
enactment of specific environmental control regulations. Thus, it at-
tempts to balance the interests of the mining industry against the pro-
tection of the marine environment.
Ocean mining is an infant industry, and its future is unsettled.
88. See Appendix 1.
89. Act, supra note I, at § 302(a). Any person subject to a civil penalty under the preceeding
section may obtain review in a federal district court upon proper filing of notice of appeal.
Id § 302(b).
90. Id § 304.
91. Id § 117(a).
92. Id §§ 117(a) (jurisdiction of the court), 117(a)(2) (standing).
93. Id § 117(a)(2).
94. Id § 117(c).
95. The Act proscribes any issuance of an exploration license before July 1, 1981. Mining per-
mits are to be prohibited until January 1, 1988. Id. § 102(cX)(D).
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While the NOAA is currently recognized in the international sphere for
its oceanic research programs, it is also a relatively small and highly
specialized federal agency.96 Its specialization may make the NOAA
more efficient in dealing with ocean mining problems than a larger ad-
ministrative body. For example, the NOAA may be more efficient in
granting a ruling on aspects of mining technology or environmental
criteria crucial to the future of a particular mining operation than
would a larger, more established agency.
The Act imposes relatively moderate economic sanctions upon in-
dustry for noncompliance with federal standards. While higher civil
and criminal penalties may encourage compliance with environmental
protection regulations, two arguments may be set forth in favor of the
penalties set by the Act. First, severely penalizing an infant industry
during its critical developmental stage is unwise. Although the mining
industry is an industrial giant, the tremendous outlays of capital re-
quired to set up an ocean mining operation present a significant risk,
especially in view of the unknown environmental consequences. Sec-
ondly, even severe economic sanctions may not deter mining compa-
nies from violating the law. In certain instances, administrative action
to suspend or revoke a license or permit may be more effective than
high penalties. In situations where the mining operation is earning
high profits, economic sanctions would be of only relative effect. Ulti-
mately, the desirability of heavy sanctions must be weighed against the
drawback of excluding smaller mining operators from participating in
ocean exploration or recovery operations. For these reasons, it is better
to delay passage of legislation imposing heavier economic sanctions
until the mining industry begins to generate significant profits or an
enforcement problem arises.
From the viewpoint of the mining industry, the Act represents a
compromise forged during protracted Congressional hearings and de-
liberations. The mining consortia required a seabed mining act in or-
der to acquire investment capital. To achieve that end, industry was
willing to recognize the need for strong environmental provisions to
assure that deep ocean mining activity would not pollute the seas.97
96. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) was formed on October 3,
1970. The primary mission of the NOAA is to explore, map and chart the global ocean and
its environs. It is responsible for monitoring and predicting weather conditions affecting the
ocean, atmosphere and sun, and to issue warnings about destructive natural events. In addi-
tion to environmental monitoring, the NOAA provides weather reporting service for the
United States and territories. The NOAA also oversees an integrated program of manage-
ment, research and service related to the protection and use of marine resources. See OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE, UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT MANUAL 167-169 (rev. ed. 1980).
97. Testimony of mining industry officials before Congress reveals a gradual appreciation for the
arguments of environmentalists. While industry spokesmen cannot be characterized as being
convinced of environmental hazards, they have shown a willingness to compromise in order
to secure a balanced deep seabed mining act which would allow securement of bank capital.
For example, Mr. Marne A. Dubs, representing the American Mining Congress, ex-
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From the viewpoint of environmentalists, however, the Act is bene-
ficial. Environmental groups have standing under the Act to obtain
either equitable relief against noncomplying mining operators or a writ
of mandamus against the Administrator of the NOAA. Under the con-
stitutional standard for standing to sue for "esthetic" or environmental
injury, environmental groups must show some "particularized injury"
to themselves or to individual members of the group.98 While such a
showing may be difficult in cases involving ocean pollution, it will be
possible for an environmental group to join its claim to that of another
party who suffers a more tangible injury. In fact, it is conceivable that
a foreign plaintiff may be joined by an international environmental
group pursuing remedies in a United States court for injuries arising on
foreign shores due to mining operations conducted on the high seas.
International Considerations
Whether or not the United States ultimately ratifies the LOS
Treaty, ocean pollution continues to be a significant international issue.
While full-scale ocean mining does not yet exist, ocean mining compa-
nies are now expanding their operations.99 Even experimental ocean
mining could have an impact upon the ocean environment. Some form
of international control on the mining consortia is necessary. Domestic
legislation creates needed controls over United States mining operators
to assure that seabed exploration and recovery programs will be moni-
tored.
The legislation also establishes strong environmental controls simi-
lar to those required by the LOS Treaty. The Act thereby signals to the
delegates of the LOS Conference the United States' commitment to en-
vironmental protection and deep seabed mining.
Several years may pass before the LOS Treaty is ratified. During
this period, domestic legislation will foster continued scientific explora-
tion of the oceans and, at the same time, compel environmental moni-
toring of exploration activity. Furthermore, the Act delays full-scale
pressed the willingness of the mining industry to support the final version of S. 493. As he
stated:
[Flor all practical purposes, we believe that industry, the Administration, the environ-
mental community and other interested groups have [made] a very successful attempt
to develop a more uniformly acceptable bill . . . . Our assessment is that this Senate
bill, now S. 493, probably commands the widest range of support among all interested
parties, primarily because of the painstaking efforts to hammer out compromise pro-
visions which reflect the balance of interests at stake.
1979 LOS Hearings, supra note 2, at 163.
98. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (an individualized noneconomic injury may
amount to an "injury in fact"); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 699 (1973) (an allegation
that individual members of the plaintiff organization will suffer in their use of the environ-
ment adequately raises standing); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Gp., 438 U.S. 59
(1978) (a causal connection between the environmental injury complained of and the consti-
tutional rights being asserted need not be demonstrated for the purpose of standing).
99. See Appendix II.
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mining operations until 1988. In the event that the LOS Treaty has not
been fully implemented by that date, the Act guarantees that the harm-
ful environmental effects of such operations will be studied. The Act
thereby establishes a framework for domestic compliance with the LOS
Treaty and coordination with an international regime for the oceans. 10o
Domestic legislation makes possible the transition to the oceanic re-
gime being devised by the LOS Conference. Its taxation of the mining
industry will establish a trust fund that will eventually be used to meet
United States obligations imposed by the International Seabed Author-
ity. 10' More importantly, the Act imposes strong environmental con-
trol regulations on exploratory and mining operations in the oceans.
These regulations not only create a framework for domestic adoption
of the LOS Treaty but provide a pattern for other nations to follow in
establishing their own marine pollution standards.
CONCLUSION
After years of deliberation and compromise, the United States has
passed an interim deep seabed mining act with strong controls for envi-
ronmental protection. The mining consortia involved in the develop-
ment of deep ocean mining have displayed a willingness to cooperate
in establishing such controls, because their cooperation aided the pas-
sage of legislation promoting the timely development of investment
capital. Prospective profits are substantial. Mining operators can,
therefore, afford to proceed with caution. Without compulsion by in-
ternational agreement, the United States has undertaken the responsi-
bility to impose upon domestic mining operations stringent
requirements for the protection of the shared ocean environment. In so
doing, the United States has not only demonstrated its commitment to
achieving international environmental goals but also set the stage for
ultimate ratification of the oceanic regime established by the Law of
the Sea Treaty.
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act has addressed forth-
rightly the complex problems involved in establishing federal guide-
lines to protect the marine environment. While passage of legislation,
alone, is merely a first step, it permits deep ocean mining to proceed at
a cautious pace--given optimal cooperation among industry, environ-
100. See Appendix I.
101. See note 65 supra.
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mentalists, and government.10 2
Charles Douglas Oliver*
102. The Reagan Administration has announced a program to reevaluate government regulations
which impact domestic industry. A shift in federal policy could require administrative agen-
cies to ease environmental control regulations. While some softening of government regula-
tion may be desirable to ease economic stagnation, it would be extremely unwise for the
United States to ease environmental regulations on deep seabed mining operations. In addi-
tion to raising the international issues discussed in this note, such a change in policy would
destroy legislation which has been eight years in the making. The mining industry has ex-
pressed its willingness to live with the Act. Given the prospective impact of mining on the
ocean environment, and the obligations for environmental protection imposed by the pend-
ing oceanic regime, the Administration should permit this legislation to fulfill its intended
objectives.
The Reagan Administration has also announced deferment of final conference action on
the LOS Treaty. While it is understandable that the new administration would want to re-
view these complex negotiations, it would be inadvisable for the government to abandon
compromises which were won in "tough and protracted battles" with other nations. See The
Wallstreet Journal, Mar. 9, 1981, at 17, col. 4 (letter to the editor by Elliot L. Richardson).
* A.B., University of San Francisco, 1967; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1981.
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APPENDIX II
DEEPSEA MINING CONSORTIA
Manganese nodules, potato-shaped objects which pave sections of the sea floor beneath 3,000-
6,000 metres of water, have long been the subject of scientific interest. Recently, a number of
companies have become interested in mining nodules as a business: nodules, after all, constitute
an ore, basically of manganese, but with commercially interesting proportions of nickel, copper,
cobalt and various trace metals.'
The main actors on the commercial stage are eight consortia, six of which are actively engaged
in operations. Bringing these resources into full commercial production will require considerable
research and development work, capital, skilled labour and sophisticated hardware, all of which
are beyond the ability of one company to put its resources to risk. So, consortia perform a division
of labour and a sharing of risk. The information given below on the composition and activities of
the consortia has been gathered from published sources and from consultations with industry
insiders and analysts. Its purpose is to identify the actors and their work to date, and it is not, by
any means, an analysis of the industry.
i. KENNECOTT EXPLORATION CORPORATION
Commonly known as: Kennecott Group. Established: January 1974.
Equity capital: $50 m.
Composition:
Kennecott Copper Corp. - USA 50%
Subs: RTZ Deepsea
Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ) Ltd. - UK Enterprises Ltd. 10%
Consolidated Goldfields Ltd. - UK 10%
British Petroleum (BP) Co. - UK Subs: BP Minerals Ltd. 10%
Noranda Mines Ltd. - Canada 10%
Mitsubishi Corp. - Japan 10%
Exploration activities: Extensive exploration in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone; last cruise in
1977; no longer actively exploring.
Test mining activities: Collector test, at one-fifth scale, in 1975. Pipe system tested at sea.
Test processing activities: Finished construction of a pilot processing plant in 1976; capac-
ity is about one-half ton per day. Essentially inactive since 1976.
Plans: To test mining system of one-fifth scale including collector as well as ore-lifting
met9od.
2. OCEAN MINING ASSOCIATES (Acronym: OMA)
Commonly known as: US Steel Group or Deepsea Ventures Group.
Established: 1974. Equity capital: $50 m.
Composition:
United States Steel (USS) Corp. - USA Subs: Essex Minerals Co. 33-1/3%
United Mini~re S.A. - Belgium Subs: Union Seas Inc. 33-1/3%
Sun Co. Inc. - USA Subs: Sun Ocean Ventures 33-1/3%
This consortium evolved out of Deepsea Ventures Inc. (DVI), which started as a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Tenneco - USA and was joined by Japanese Manganese Nodule Develop-
ment Co. (JAMCO), a Japanese group consisting of C. Itoh, Nichimen and Kanematsu-Gosho.
Later, US Steel and Union Miniere joined the venture, but Tenneco and JAMCO withdrew. With
Sun as a recent partner, OMA was formed.
Exploration activities: Extensive exploration in Clarion-Clippertone Zone by exploration
ship Prospector; 1974 - claims announced for a 60,000 sq. kin. minesite in the Zone, be-
tween latitudes 14016' N and l5o44 ' N, and between longitudes 124*20' W and 127*46
' W.
Test mining activities: 1970 - DVI demonstrated airlift system offshore Florida at depth of
800 i; late 1978 - completed prototype testing with Deepsea Miner II, recovering 500 tons
of material.
Test processing activities: Finished construction of pilot processing plant.
Plans: Plans to convert ore carrier Weser Ore as test mining ship.
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3. OCEAN MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED (Acronym: OMI, OMINC)
Commonly known as: INCO group. Established: February 1975.
Head Office: New York, New York. Equity capital: $45 m.
Composition:
International Nickel Co. (INCO) Ltd. - Canada 25%
Sedco Inc. - USA 25%
Metallgesellschaft AG - FRG Cons: Arbeitgemeinschaft
Meerestechnischge-
Preussag AG - FRG winbare 25%
Salzgitter AG - FRG Rohstoffe (AMR)
23 companies - Japan Cons: Deep Ocean Mining Co. (DOMCO) Ltd. 25%
The Japanese companies include nine from Sumitomo group, Bank of Tokyo, Dowa Mining,
ldemitsu, Industrial Bank of Japan, Komatsu, Kyokuyo, Marubeni, Mitsui OSK Lines, Nippon
Mining, Nissho-Iwai, Shinko Electric, Tokyo Rope Manufacturing and Toyo Menka. 1977 -
Rheinische Braunkohlenwerke - FRG, which was the fourth partner in AMR, withdrew.
Exploration activities: Extensive exploration in Clarion-Clipperton Zone by exploration
ships aldivia and Sonne.
Test mining activities: Mid-1978 - three successful test runs by Sedco 445, a drillship
converted to a test mining ship; sea trials established technical feasibility of lifting capabil-
ity, pumping system and air lift method.
Test processing activities: A pilot processing plant for testing purposes has been developed.
Plans: In the process of evaluating the data gathered during test mining in order to use
them in the design of commercial mining system; nodule bulk sample mined during test
operations will be used in the pilot processing plant. German partners are continuing ex-
ploration work.
4. OCEAN MINERALS COMPANY (Acronym: OMC, OMCO)
Commonly known as: Lockheed Group. Established:
November 1977.
Head Office: Mt. View, California, USA. Equity capital: $50 m.
Composition:
Lockheed Missiles and
Space Co. - USA 53.3%)
Billiton BV - Netherlands 53.3%) Cons: Ocean
Bos Kalis Westminister (BKW)
Ocean Minerals BV 53.3%) Minerals Inc. 75%
Standard Oil of Indiana - Subs: Amoco 75%
USA Ocean
Minerals Co.
Exploration activities: Exploration in Clarion-Clipperton Zone by exploration ship Gover-
nor Ray; mid- 1978 - recovered 450 samples (several thousands lbs.) of nodules by free-
fall grab samplers; planned programme of six cruises began.
Test mining activities: Successfully completed one-fourth scale collector test in mud pit.
Late 1978 - Glomar Explorer, on lease to the consortium, completed shallow water test at
depth of 1,800 m; November 1978 - deepsea testing at depth of 5,000 m cancelled due to
rough seas and mechanical problems with doors at the bottom of Glomar Explorer.
Test processing activities: Ground broken for test plant in Hawaii; operation scheduled by
mid-1979, at 50 mt/day for 3-5 years.
Plans: Test mine at depth of 5,000 m; operate pilot processing plant.
5. ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE POUR L'ETUDE ET LA RECHERCHE DES
NODULES (AFERNOD)
Commonly known as: French Group. Head Office: Paris, France.
Composition: Several French Government agencies, including Centre National pour
l'Lxploltatlon des Octans (CNEXO), Comissariat A l'Energie Atomique (CEA) and Bureau
des Recherches G~ologiques et Mini~res (BRGM) and a few private companies including
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Soci 6t Le Nicket (SLN) and Chantiers de France-Bunkerque, a member of the Empain
Schneider Group.
Exploration activities: Perhaps the most systematic exploration of Clariton-Clipperton
area, using optiised grid patterns.
Plans: Focus on detailed exploration and equipment development.
6. CONTINUOUS LINE BUCKET (CLB) SYNDICATE
Commonly known as: CLB Group.
Composition: About 20 companies from 6 countries - USA, FRG, France, Canada, Ja-
pan an Australia. These include US Steel - USA, AMR - FRG, CNEXO and SDN
from France, INCO and Noranda Mines from Canada, DOMCO, Sumitomo Heavy Indus-
tries and Furukawa from Japan and Broken Hill Proprietory (BHP) from Australia. Com-
position of CLB Group varies by test.
Test mining activities: Tested one ship system in 1970-1972.
7. DEEP OCEAN MINERALS ASSOCIATION (DOMA)
Commonly known as: Japanese Group. Head Office: Tokyo, Japan.
Composition: An association between Japanese industry and government. Thirty-five Jap-
anese companies including three from Mitsubishi group, four from Mitsui group, six from
Nippon group, four from Sumitomo group and C. Itoh, Dowa Mining, Furukawa,
Kanematsu-Gosho, Kyokuyo, Marubeni, Nichimen, Nissho-Iwai and Tokyo Menka.
Exloration activities: Carried out by Metal Mining Agency, a semi-commercial entity,
ed to M of Japanese Government; co-operative arrangement with Geological Sur-
vey to use vessel Hakurei-Maru; survey on southern Hawaiian seas.
Plans: Extensive exploration by new ship launched in 1980.
8. EUROCEAN
Established: 1970
Composition: Twenty-four European companies; France - 2, Belgium - 3, Netherlands
- 4 including Bos Kalis, UK - I, Italy - 3, Sweden - 8 including Boldien, Graenges
and Kockums, Norway - 1, Spain - 1, and Switzerland - I.
Activities: Of non-commercial nature, directed to scientific research and survey.
For an up-to-date evaluation of the scientific, technical and economic aspects of the nodule
industry, see Manganese Nodules." Dimensions and Perspectives, Proceedings of a U.N. Expert
Group Meeting on Sea-Bed Mineral Resource Assessment (D. Reidel Publishing Co., Nether-
lands, in press).
Reprinted from Law of the Sea, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oceanography on H.A
2759, H.R. 3268, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 156-159 (1979); Originally taken from FACTS, U.N.
DESI FACTS 79/1 (1979).
